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Abstract
This paper conducts a quantitative analysis of the role of ﬁnancial shocks and credit
frictions aﬀecting the banking sector in driving U.S. business cycles. I ﬁrst document three
key business cycle stylized facts of aggregate ﬁnancial variables in the U.S. banking sector:
(i) Bank credit, deposits and loan spread are less volatile than output, while net worth
and leverage ratio are more volatile, (ii) bank credit and net worth are procyclical, while
deposits, leverage ratio and loan spread are countercyclical, and (iii) ﬁnancial variables lead
the output ﬂuctuations by one to three quarters. I then present an equilibrium business
cycle model with a ﬁnancial sector, featuring a moral hazard problem between banks and its
depositors, which leads to endogenous capital constraints for banks in obtaining funds from
households. The model incorporates empirically-disciplined shocks to bank net worth (i.e.
“ﬁnancial shocks”) that alter the ability of banks to borrow and to extend credit to non-
ﬁnancial businesses. I show that the benchmark model is able to deliver most of the above
stylized facts. Financial shocks and credit frictions in banking sector are important not
only for explaining the dynamics of ﬁnancial variables but also for the dynamics of standard
macroeconomic variables. Financial shocks play a major role in driving real ﬂuctuations due
to their impact on the tightness of bank capital constraint and the credit spread.
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1 Introduction
What are the cyclical properties of ﬁnancial ﬂows in the U.S. banking sector? How important
are ﬁnancial shocks relative standard productivity shocks in driving real and ﬁnancial business
cycles in the U.S.? To address these questions, this paper proposes an equilibrium business cycle
model with a ﬁnancial sector, that is capable of matching both real and ﬁnancial ﬂuctuations
observed in the U.S. data. Although the relevance of ﬁnancial shocks together with an explicit
modeling of frictions in ﬁnancial sector has received attention recently, the behavior of aggregate
ﬁnancial variables in the U.S. banking sector and how they interact with real variables over the
business cycle have not been fully explored in the literature.1 Most previous studies have not
tried to match ﬂuctuations in both standard macro variables and aggregate ﬁnancial variables
simultaneously. In this paper, I show that ﬁnancial shocks to banking sector contribute signiﬁ-
cantly to explaining the observed dynamics of real and ﬁnancial variables. Financial shocks play
a major role in driving real ﬂuctuations due to their impact on the tightness of bank capital
constraint and credit spread.
I ﬁrst systematically document the business cycle properties of aggregate ﬁnancial variables,
using the data on U.S. commercial banks from the Federal Reserve Board.2 The following
empirical facts emerge from the analysis: (i) Bank credit, deposits, and loan spread are less
volatile than output, while net worth and leverage ratio are more volatile, (ii) bank assets and
net worth are procyclical, while deposits, leverage ratio, and loan spread are countercyclical,
and (iii) ﬁnancial variables lead the output ﬂuctuations by one to three quarters.
I then assess the quantitative performance of a theoretical model by its ability to match
these empirical facts. In particular, there are two main departures from an otherwise standard
real business cycle framework in order to have balance sheet ﬂuctuations of ﬁnancial sector
matter for real ﬂuctuations. The ﬁrst departure is that I introduce an active banking sector
with ﬁnancial frictions into the model, which are modeled as in Gertler and Karadi (2011).
Financial frictions require that banks borrow funds from households and their ability to borrow
is limited due to a moral hazard (costly enforcement) problem, leading to an endogenous capital
constraint for banks in obtaining deposits.3 The second departure is that the model incorporates
1See Christiano et. al. (2010), Dib (2010), Meh and Moran (2010), Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010), Gertler and
Karadi (2011), Kollman et al. (2011).
2I also document the business cycle properties of aggregate financial variables of the whole U.S. financial sector
from 1952 to 2009, using the Flow of Funds data. Interested readers may look at Appendix D.
3Hellmann, Murdock and Stiglitz (2000) argue that moral hazard in banking sector plays a crucial role in most
of the U.S. economic downturns in the last century. Moreover, the presence of the agency problem makes the
balance sheet structure of financial sector matter for real fluctuations, invalidating the application of Modigliani-
Miller theorem to the model economy presented below.
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shocks to bank net worth (i.e.“ﬁnancial shocks”) that alter the ability of banks to borrow and
to extend loans to non-ﬁnancial businesses.4 This shock can be interpreted as a redistribution
shock, which transfers some portion of the wealth from ﬁnancial intermediaries to households.5
However, because of the moral hazard problem between households and bankers, it distorts
intermediaries’ role of allocating resources between households and ﬁrms, inducing large real
eﬀects.
I construct the time series of ﬁnancial shocks as the residuals from the law of motion for
bank net worth, using empirical data for credit spread, leverage ratio, deposit rate and net
worth. This approach is similar to the standard method for constructing productivity shocks
as Solow residuals from the production function using empirical series for output, capital and
labor. 6 The shock series show that U.S. economy is severely hit by negative ﬁnancial shocks
in the Great Recession. Finally, in order to elucidate the underlying mechanism as clearly as
possible, I abstract from various real and nominal rigidities that are generally considered in
medium scale DSGE models such as Christiano et. al. (2005) and Smets and Wouters (2007).
In the theoretical model, there are three main results. First, the benchmark model driven by
both standard productivity and ﬁnancial shocks is able to deliver most of the stylized cyclical
facts about real and ﬁnancial variables simultaneously. Second, ﬁnancial shocks to banking
sector are important not only for explaining the dynamics of ﬁnancial variables but also for the
dynamics of standard macroeconomic variables. In particular, the model simulations show that
the benchmark model driven by both shocks has better predictions about investment, hours and
output than the frictionless version of the model (which is standard RBC model with capital
4Hancock, Laing and Wilcox (1995), Peek and Rosengren (1997, 2000) empirically show that adverse shocks
to bank capital contributed significantly to the U.S. economic downturns of the late 1980s and early 1990s. The-
oretically, Meh and Moran (2010) consider shocks that originate within the banking sector and produce sudden
shortages in bank capital. They suggest that these shocks reflect periods of financial distress and weakness in
financial markets. Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) introduce shocks to bank capital and interpret them as
independent shocks arising from other activities like investment banking. Curdia and Woodford (2010) introduce
exogenous increases in the fraction of loans that are not repaid and exogenous increases in real financial inter-
mediation costs, both of which reduce net worth of financial intermediaries exogenously. Mendoza and Quadrini
(2010) study the effect of net worth shocks on asset prices and interpret these shocks as unexpected loan losses
due to producers’ default on their debt. A complete model of the determination of the fluctuations in net worth
of banks is beyond the scope of this paper, because my goal is to analyze the quantitative effects of movements
in net worth of financial sector on business cycle fluctuations of real and financial variables.
5This interpretation is suggested by Iacoviello (2010). He argues that 1990-91 and 2007-09 recessions can
be characterized by situations in which some borrowers pay less than contractually agreed upon and financial
institutions that extend loans to these borrowers suffer from loan losses, resulting in some sort of a redistribution
of wealth between borrowers (households and firms) and lenders (banks).
6I also consider some alternative measures of financial shocks, including the one constructed based on loan
losses incurred by U.S. commercial banks (using the charge-off and delinquency rates data compiled by the
Federal Reserve Board). The construction of these alternative measures and their simulation results can be
found in Appendix E. The main results of the paper do not change under these alternative measures.
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adjustment costs) and the model driven only by productivity shocks. The benchmark model
also performs better than the model with only productivity shocks in terms of its predictions
about aggregate ﬁnancial variables.7 Third, the tightness of bank capital constraint given by
the Lagrange multiplier in the theoretical model (which determines the banks’ ability to extend
credit to non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms) tracks the index of tightening credit standards (which shows the
adverse changes in banks’ lending) constructed by the Federal Reserve Board quite well.
The economic intuition for why ﬁnancial shocks matter a lot for real ﬂuctuations in the model
lies in the eﬀect of these shocks on the tightness of bank capital constraint and credit spread.
When ﬁnancial shocks move the economy around the steady state, they lead to large ﬂuctuations
in the tightness of bank capital constraint as evidenced by the big swings in the Lagrange
multiplier of the constraint. Since credit spread is a function of this Lagrange multiplier,
ﬂuctuations in the latter translate into variations in the former. Credit spread appears as a
positive wedge in the intertemporal Euler equation, which determines how households’ deposits
(savings in the economy) are transformed into bank credit to non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms. Fluctuations
in this wedge move the amount of deposits, therefore the amount of bank credit that can be
extended to ﬁrms. Since productive ﬁrms ﬁnance their capital expenditures via bank credit,
movements in the latter translate into the ﬂuctuations in capital stock. Because hours worked is
complementary to capital stock in a standard Cobb-Douglas production function, empirically-
relevant ﬂuctuations in capital stock lead to empirically-observed ﬂuctuations in hours, which
eventually generate observed ﬂuctuations in output.
This paper contributes to recently growing empirical and theoretical literature studying
the role of ﬁnancial sector on business cycle ﬂuctuations. On the empirical side, Adrian and
Shin (2008, 2009) provide evidence on the time series behavior of balance sheet items of some
ﬁnancial intermediaries using the Flow of Funds data.8 However, they do not present standard
business cycle statistics of ﬁnancial ﬂows.9 On the theoretical side, the current paper diﬀers
from the existing literature on ﬁnancial accelerator eﬀects on demand for credit, arising from
the movements in the strength of borrowers’ balance sheets.10 I focus on ﬂuctuations in supply
7The RBC model with capital adjustment costs has no predictions about financial variables since balance
sheets of banks in that model are indeterminate.
8They argue that to the extent that balance sheet fluctuations affect the supply of credit, they have the
potential to explain real fluctuations, and they empirically show that bank equity has a significant forecasting
power for GDP growth.
9The notion of “procyclical” in their papers is with respect to total assets of financial intermediaries, not with
respect to GDP as in the current paper. In that sense, this paper undertakes a more standard business cycle
accounting exercise.
10For example, see Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), Carlstrom and Fuerst (1998), Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist
(1999)
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of credit driven by movements in the strength of lenders’ balance sheets. Meh and Moran (2010)
investigate the role of bank capital in transmission of technology, bank capital and monetary
policy shocks in a medium-scale New Keynesian, double moral hazard framework. Jermann and
Quadrini (2010) study the importance of credit shocks in non-ﬁnancial sector in explaining the
cyclical properties of equity and debt payouts of U.S. non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms in a model without a
banking sector.
An independent paper that is closely related and complementary to our work is Iacoviello
(2011). In a DSGE framework with households, banks, and entrepreneurs each facing endoge-
nous borrowing constraints, he studies how repayment shocks undermine the ﬂow of funds
between savers and borrowers in the recent recession. My work is diﬀerent from his paper
in terms of both empirical and theoretical contributions. First, in terms of empirical work, I
systemically document the business cycle properties of aggregate ﬁnancial variables in the U.S.
banking sector from 1987 to 2010, which I then use to judge the quantitative performance of the
theoretical model, while his paper particularly focuses on the 2007-09 recession. Second, in the
theoretical model presented below, only the banking sector faces endogenous capital constraints,
which gives me the ability to isolate the role of banks in the transmission of ﬁnancial shocks
from the role of household and production sectors. Finally, I employ a diﬀerent methodology of
constructing the series of ﬁnancial shocks from the data. In terms of normative policy, Angeloni
and Faia (2010) examine the role of banks in the interaction between monetary policy and
macroprudential regulations in a New Keynesian model with bank runs, while Gertler & Kiy-
otaki (2010), and Gertler & Karadi (2011) investigate the eﬀects of central bank’s credit policy
aimed at troubled banks.11 Finally, in an open-economy framework, Kollmann (2011) studies
how a bank capital constraint aﬀects the international business cycles driven by productivity
and loan default shocks in a two-country RBC model with a global bank.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: In Section 2, I document evidence on the
real and ﬁnancial ﬂuctuations in U.S. data. Section 3 describes the theoretical model. Section
4 presents the model parametrization and calibration together with the quantitative results of
the model. Section 5 concludes.
2 Real and Financial Fluctuations in the U.S. economy
This section documents some key empirical features of ﬁnancial cycles in the U.S. economy. The
upper left panel of Figure 1 displays quarterly time series for loan losses of U.S. commercial
11The latter also features the interbank market.
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banks from 1987 to 2010. The loan loss rates are expressed as annualized percentages of GDP.
The ﬁgure shows that loan loss rates increased in last three recessions of the U.S. economy.
The loss rates peaked in both 1990-91 and 2007-09 recessions, reaching its highest level of 5%
in the latter. The upper right panel of Figure 1 plots daily time series for Dow Jones Bank
Index from 1992 to 2010. The ﬁgure suggests that the market value of banks’ shares declined
substantially in the recent recession. Finally, the middle left panel of Figure 1 displays real
net worth growth of U.S. commercial banks (year-on-year). The ﬁgure suggests that banks’
net worth shrank in last three recessions of the U.S. economy, with a reduction of 40% in the
2007-09 recession. These three plots convey a common message: substantial loan losses incurred
by banks together with the fall in their equity prices typically cause large declines in banks’ net
worth, which might lead to persistent and mounting pressures on bank balance sheets, worsening
the aggregate credit conditions, and thus causing the observed decline in real economic activity,
which is much more pronounced in the Great Recession.
The middle left panel of Figure 1 plots commercial and industrial loan spreads over federal
funds rate (annualized). The ﬁgure shows that bank lending spreads sky-rocketed in the recent
crisis, reaching a 3.2% per annum towards the end of the recession and they keep rising although
the recession was oﬃcially announced to be over. The bottom left panel displays real bank credit
growth rates (year-on-year). The ﬁgure indicates that bank credit growth fell signiﬁcantly in
the recent economic downturn. Taken together, these ﬁgures suggest that the U.S. economy
has experienced a signiﬁcant deterioration in aggregate credit conditions as total bank lending
to non-ﬁnancial sector declined sharply and the cost of funds for non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms increased
substantially. Finally, the bottom right panel of Figure 1 plots real deposit growth rates (year-
on-year). The ﬁgure shows that growth rate of deposits began to fall substantially right after
the recent recession.
I will assess the performance of the model below by its ability to match empirical cyclical
properties of real and ﬁnancial variables in the U.S data. Table 1 presents the business cycle
properties of aggregate ﬁnancial variables in U.S. commercial banking sector together with
standard macro aggregates for the period 1987-2010.12 The correlation coeﬃcients in bold
font are the maximum ones in their respective rows, which indicate the lead-lag relationship of
variables with output. The aggregate ﬁnancial variables I consider are U.S. commercial banks’
12I focus on the period that begins in 1987 for two reasons. First, U.S. banking sector witnessed a significant
transformation starting from 1987 such as deregulation of deposit rates, increases in financial flexibility. Second,
it also corresponds to a structural break in the volatility of many standard macro variables, which is so-called
Great Moderation.
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Figure 1: Financial Flows in the U.S. Economy
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Table 1: Business Cycle Properties of Real and Financial Variables, Quarterly U.S. Data, 1987- 2010
Standard
Deviation xt−4 xt−3 xt−2 xt−1 xt xt+1 xt+2 xt+3 xt+4
Real Variables
Output 1.80 0.15 0.39 0.66 0.87 1.00 0.87 0.66 0.39 0.15
Consumption 0.45 -0.20 0.06 0.37 0.66 0.82 0.80 0.67 0.46 0.25
Investment 2.73 0.27 0.49 0.71 0.87 0.97 0.82 0.59 0.33 0.09
Hours 0.91 -0.01 0.19 0.43 0.65 0.83 0.89 0.83 0.68 0.44
Financial Variables
Bank credit 0.93 -0.20 -0.11 0.02 0.14 0.30 0.47 0.63 0.68 0.63
Deposits 0.69 -0.02 -0.08 -0.18 -0.30 -0.39 -0.42 -0.34 -0.22 -0.07
Net Worth 5.17 -0.15 -0.03 0.14 0.32 0.52 0.70 0.80 0.76 0.63
Leverage Ratio 5.61 0.16 0.05 -0.12 -0.30 -0.49 -0.66 -0.74 -0.70 -0.55
Loan Spread 0.08 0.05 0.04 -0.08 -0.21 -0.39 -0.42 -0.43 -0.32 -0.18
a Business cycle statistics in the table are based on HP-filtered cyclical components of quarterly empirical time series
(smoothing parameter:1600).
b The standard deviation of output is expressed in percent; standard deviations of the remaining variables are normalized
by the standard deviation of output (std(x)/std(GDP)).
c The correlation coefficients in bold font are the maximum ones in their respective rows.
d Data sources are provided in Appendix A.
assets (bank credit), liabilities (deposits), net worth, leverage ratio and loan spread. Quarterly
seasonally-adjusted ﬁnancial data are taken from the Federal Reserve Board. Quarterly real
data are taken from Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED) of St. Louis FED. Financial data
at the FED Board is nominal. GDP deﬂator from NIPA accounts is used to deﬂate the ﬁnancial
time series. See the data appendix for a more detailed description.
Table 1 gives us the following empirical facts about real and ﬁnancial variables. Consumption
and hours are less volatile than output, while investment is more volatile; and consumption,
investment, and hours are all strongly procyclical with respect to output. These are standard
business-cycle facts; for example, see King and Rebelo (1999). Bank credit, deposits, and
loan spread are less volatile than output, while net worth and leverage ratio are more volatile.
Bank assets and net worth are procyclical, while deposits, leverage ratio, and loan spread are
countercyclical. Finally, all ﬁnancial variables lead the output ﬂuctuations by one to three
quarters.13
13I also reproduce Table 1 for the period 1987:Q1-2007:Q1 in order to see whether the empirical results are
driven or at least substantially affected by the recent economic events starting at 2007:Q3 or not. The reproduced
table is available upon request. The results show that the key stylized facts about real and financial variables
described above are robust to the sample period taken.
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Table 2: The Sequence of Events in a Given Time Period
1. Productivity zt is realized.
2. Firms hire labor Ht and use capital Kt they purchased in period t− 1, which are used for production, Yt = ztF(Kt, Ht).
3. Firms make their wage payments wtHt and dividend payments to shareholders (banks) from period t-1.
4. Banks make their interest payments on deposits of households from period t-1 and bankers exit with probability (1-θ).
5. Recovery rate ωt is realized.
6. Households make their consumption and saving decisions and deposit their resources at banks.
7. Firms sell their depreciated capital to capital producers. These agents make investment and produce new capital Kt+1.
8. Firms issue shares [st = Kt+1] and sell these shares to banks to finance their capital expenditures.
9. Banks purchase firms’ shares and their incentive constraints bind.
10. Firms purchase capital Kt+1 from capital producers at the price of qt with borrowed funds.
3 A Business Cycle Model with Financial Sector
The model is an otherwise standard real business cycle model with a ﬁnancial sector. Credit
frictions in ﬁnancial sector are modeled as in Gertler and Karadi (2011). I introduce shocks to
bank net worth on top of the standard productivity shocks. The model economy consists of four
types of agents: households, ﬁnancial intermediaries, ﬁrms, and capital producers. The ability
of ﬁnancial intermediaries to borrow from households is limited due to a moral hazard (costly
enforcement) problem, which will be described below. Firms acquire capital in each period by
selling shares to ﬁnancial intermediaries. Finally, capital producers are incorporated into the
model in order to introduce capital adjustment costs in a tractable way. Table 2 shows the
sequence of events in a given time period in the theoretical model described below. The section
below will clarify this timeline.
3.1 Households
There is a continuum of identical households of measure unity. Households are inﬁnitely-lived
with preferences over consumption (ct) and leisure (1− Lt) given by
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtU(ct, 1− Lt) (1)
Each household consumes and supplies labor to ﬁrms at the market clearing real wage wt.
In addition, they save by holding deposits at a riskless real return rt at competitive ﬁnancial
intermediaries.
There are two types of members within each household: workers and bankers. Workers
supply labor and return the wages they earn to the household while each banker administers a
ﬁnancial intermediary and transfers any earnings back to the household. Hence, the household
owns the ﬁnancial intermediaries that its bankers administer. However, the deposits that the
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household holds are put in ﬁnancial intermediaries that it doesn’t own.14 Moreover, there is
perfect consumption insurance within each household.
At any point in time the fraction 1 − ζ of the household members are workers and the re-
maining fraction ζ are bankers. An individual household member can switch randomly between
these two jobs over time. A banker this period remains a banker next period with probability θ,
which is independent of the banker’s history. Therefore, the average survival time for a banker
in any given period is 1/(1− θ). The bankers are not inﬁnitely-lived in order to make sure that
they don’t reach a point where they can ﬁnance all equity investment from their own net worth.
Hence, every period (1− θ)ζ bankers exit and become workers while the same mass of workers
randomly become bankers, keeping the relative proportion of workers and bankers constant.
Period t bankers learn about survival and exit at the beginning of period t + 1. Bankers who
exit from the ﬁnancial sector transfer their accumulated earnings to their respective household.
Furthermore, the household provides its new bankers with some start-up funds.15
The household budget constraint is given by
ct + bt+1 = wtLt + (1 + rt)bt +Πt (2)
The household’s subjective discount factor is β ∈ (0,1), ct denotes the household’s consump-
tion, bt+1 is the total amount of deposits that the household gives to the ﬁnancial intermediary,
rt is the non-contingent real return on the deposits from t− 1 to t, wt is the real wage rate, and
Πt is the proﬁts to the household from owning capital producers and banks net of the transfer
that it gives to its new bankers plus (minus) the amount of wealth redistributed from banks
(households) to households (banks).
The household chooses ct, Lt, and bt+1 to maximize (1) subject to the sequence of ﬂow
budget constraints in (2). The resulting ﬁrst order conditions for labor supply and deposit
holdings are given by
Ul(t)
Uc(t)
= wt (3)
Uc(t) = β(1 + rt+1)EtUc(t+ 1) (4)
14This assumption ensures independent decision-making. Depositors are not the owners of the bank, so the
banker don’t maximize the depositors’ utility, but their own expected terminal net worth.
15This assumption ensures that banks don’t have zero net worth in any period and is similar to the one about
the entrepreneurial wage in Carlstrom and Fuerst (1998), and Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999).
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The ﬁrst condition states that the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and
leisure is equal to the wage rate. The second condition is the standard consumption-savings
Euler equation, which equates the marginal cost of not consuming and saving today to the
expected discounted marginal beneﬁt of consuming tomorrow.
3.2 Financial Intermediaries
3.2.1 Balance Sheets
Financial intermediaries transfer the funds that they obtain from households to ﬁrms. They
acquire ﬁrm shares and ﬁnance these assets with household deposits and their own equity.
At the beginning of period t, before banks collect deposits, an aggregate net worth shock hits
banks’ balance sheets. Let’s denote ωt as the time-varying recovery rate of loans as a percentage
of bank net worth. Innovations to ωt are shocks to bank net worth. Therefore, ωtn˜jt is the
eﬀective net worth of the ﬁnancial intermediary. For notational convenience, I denote ωtn˜jt by
njt. Hence, njt is the net worth of ﬁnancial ﬁrm j at the beginning of period t after the net
worth shock hits. The balance sheet identity of ﬁnancial intermediary j is then given by
qtsjt = bjt+1 + njt (5)
where qt is the price of representative ﬁrm’s shares and sjt is the quantity of these shares owned
by bank j, bjt+1 is the amount of deposits that intermediary j obtains from the households,
njt is the net worth of ﬁnancial ﬁrm j at the beginning of period t after the net worth shock
hits.16 Banks undertake equity investment and ﬁrms ﬁnance their capital expenditures by
issuing shares. Therefore, the ﬁnancial contract between the intermediary and the ﬁrm is an
equity contract (or equivalently a state-dependent debt contract).
The households put their deposits into the ﬁnancial intermediary at time t and obtain
the non-contingent real return rt+1 at t + 1. Therefore, bjt+1 is the liabilities of the ﬁnancial
intermediary and njt is its equity or capital. The ﬁnancial intermediaries receive ex-post state-
contingent return, rkt+1 for their equity investment. The fact that rkt+1 is potentially greater
than rt+1 creates an incentive for bankers to engage in ﬁnancial intermediation.
The ﬁnancial intermediary’s net worth at the beginning of period t + 1 (before the time
t+1 net worth shock hits) is given by the diﬀerence between the earnings on equity investment
in ﬁrms (assets of ﬁnancial intermediary) and interest payments on deposits obtained from the
16In U.S. financial data, household deposits constitute 70% of total liabilities of banks. Boyd (2007) also
suggests that demand (checking) deposits form a substantial portion of bank liabilities.
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households (liabilities of ﬁnancial intermediary). Thus the law of motion for bank net worth is
given by
n˜jt+1 = (1 + rkt+1)qtsjt − (1 + rt+1)bjt+1 (6)
Using the balance sheet of the ﬁnancial ﬁrm given by (5), we can re-write (6) as follows:
n˜jt+1 = (rkt+1 − rt+1)qtsjt + (1 + rt+1)njt (7)
The ﬁnancial intermediary’s net worth at time t+ 1 depends on the premium rkt+1 − rt+1 that
it earns on shares purchased as well as the total value of these shares, qtsjt.
3.2.2 Profit Maximization
This section describes banks’ proﬁt maximization. The ﬁnancial intermediary j maximizes its
expected discounted terminal net worth, Vjt, by choosing the amount of ﬁrm shares, sjt, it
purchases, given by
Vjt = max
sjt
Et
∞∑
i=0
(1− θ)θiβi+1Λt,t+1+i[(rkt+1+i − rt+1+i)qt+isjt+i] + (1 + rt+1+i)njt+i] (8)
Since the risk premium is positive in any period, the ﬁnancial intermediary will always have
an incentive to buy ﬁrms’ shares. Obtaining additional funds (deposits) from the households is
the only way to achieve this. However, the agency problem described below introduces an en-
dogenous borrowing constraint for banks, thus a limit on the size of the ﬁnancial intermediaries:
At the end of the period, the ﬁnancial intermediary may choose to divert λ fraction of avail-
able funds from its shares of ﬁrms with no legal ramiﬁcation and give them to the household of
which the banker is a member. If the ﬁnancial intermediary diverts the funds, the assumed legal
structure ensures that depositors are able to force the intermediary to go bankrupt and they
may recover the remaining fraction 1− λ of the assets. They are not able to get the remaining
fraction λ of the funds since, by assumption, the cost of recovering these funds is too high.17
17As Christiano (2010) suggests, diverting funds is meant to say that bankers might not manage funds in the
interest of depositors or they might invest funds into risky projects which do not earn a high return for depositors
but a high excess return for bankers themselves (Bankers might invest λ fraction of funds into very risky projects,
which could potentially go bankrupt and reduce equilibrium return to depositors). Taking this into consideration,
depositors put their money at banks up to a threshold level beyond which if bankers make risky investments,
they do this at their own risk. This threshold level of deposits can be thought as if deposits expand beyond that
level, banks would have an incentive to default. The market discipline prevents deposits from expanding beyond
the default threshold level and interest rate spreads reflect this fear of default although defaults are not observed
in equilibrium.
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Therefore, for the banks not to have an incentive to divert the funds, the following incentive
compatibility constraint must be satisﬁed at the end of period t:
Vjt ≥ λqtsjt (9)
The left-hand side of (9) is the value of operating for the bank (or equivalently cost of
diverting funds) while the right-hand side is the gain from diverting λ fraction of assets. The
intuition for this constraint is that in order for the ﬁnancial intermediary not to divert the funds
and for the households to put their deposits into the bank, the value of operating in ﬁnancial
sector must be greater than or equal to the gain from diverting assets.
A ﬁnancial intermediary’s objective is to maximize the expected return to its portfolio
consisting of ﬁrms’ shares and its capital subject to the incentive compatibility constraint.
Then its demand for shares is fully determined by its net worth position, since as long as the
expected return from the portfolio is strictly positive, it will expand its lending (its size) until
the incentive compatibility constraint binds.
3.2.3 Leverage Ratio and Net Worth Evolution
Proposition 1 The expected discounted terminal net worth of a bank can be expressed as the sum
of expected discounted total return to its equity investment into firms and expected discounted
total return to its existing net worth.
Proof : See Appendix B.1
Proposition 1 states that that Vjt can be expressed as follows:
Vjt = νtqtsjt + ηtnjt (10)
where
νt = Et[(1− θ)βΛt,t+1(rkt+1 − rt+1) + βΛt,t+1θ
qt+1sjt+1
qtsjt
νt+1] (11)
ηt = Et[(1− θ)βΛt,t+1(1 + rt+1) + βΛt,t+1θ
njt+1
njt
ηt+1] (12)
νt can be interpreted as the expected discounted marginal gain to the bank of buying one
more unit of ﬁrms’ shares, holding its net worth njt constant. The ﬁrst term is the discounted
value of the net return on shares to the bank if it exits the ﬁnancial sector tomorrow. The
second term is the continuation value of its increased assets if it survives. Meanwhile, ηt can be
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interpreted as the expected discounted marginal beneﬁt of having one more unit of net worth,
holding qtsjt constant. The ﬁrst term is the discounted value of the return on net worth to the
bank if it exits the ﬁnancial sector tomorrow. The second term is the continuation value of its
increased net worth if it survives.
Therefore, we can write the incentive compatibility constraint as follows:
νtqtsjt + ηtnjt ≥ λqtsjt (13)
Proposition 2 The incentive compatibility constraint binds as long as 0 < νt < λ.
Proof : I prove this by contradiction. Assume that νt ≥ λ. Then the left-hand side of (13) is
always greater than the right-hand side of (13) since ηtnjt > 0 as can be seen from (12). The
franchise value of the bank is always higher than the gain from diverting funds. Therefore, the
constraint is always slack. Moreover, assume that νt ≤ 0. Since νt is the expected discounted
marginal gain to the bank of increasing its assets, the intermediary does not have the incentive
to expand its assets when νt ≤ 0. In this case, the constraint does not bind because the
intermediary does not collect any deposits from households.
The proﬁts of the ﬁnancial intermediary will be aﬀected by the premium rkt+1− rt+1 . That
is, the banker will not have any incentive to buy ﬁrms’ shares if the discounted return on these
shares is less than the discounted cost of deposits. Thus the ﬁnancial ﬁrm will continue to
operate in period t+ i if the following inequality is satisﬁed:
Et+iβΛt,t+1+i(rkt+1+i − rt+1+i) ≥ 0 ∀i ≥ 0 (14)
where βΛt,t+1+i is the stochastic discount factor that the ﬁnancial ﬁrm applies to its earnings
at t+ 1 + i. The moral hazard problem between households and banks described above limits
banks’ ability to obtain deposits from the households, leading to a positive premium. The
following proposition establishes this fact.
Proposition 3 Risk premium is positive as long as the incentive compatibility constraint binds.
Proof : See Appendix B.2
When this constraint binds, the ﬁnancial intermediary’s assets are limited by its net worth.
That is, if this constraint binds, the funds that the intermediary can obtain from households
will depend positively on its equity capital:
qtsjt =
ηt
λ− νt
njt (15)
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The constraint (15) limits the leverage of the ﬁnancial intermediary to the point where
its incentive to divert funds is exactly balanced by its loss from doing so. Thus, the costly
enforcement problem leads to an endogenous borrowing constraint on the bank’s ability to
acquire assets. When bank’s leverage ratio and/or bank equity is high, it can extend more
credit to non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms. Conversely, de-leveraging or the deterioration in net worth in bad
times will limit the bank’s ability to extend credit. Note that by manipulating this expression
using the balance sheet, I can obtain the bank’s leverage ratio as follows:
bjt+1
njt
=
ηt
λ− νt
− 1 (16)
The leverage ratio increases in the expected marginal beneﬁt of buying one more unit of
ﬁrm share, and in the expected marginal gain of having one more unit of net worth. Intuitively,
increases in ηt or νt mean that ﬁnancial intermediation is expected to be more lucrative going
forward, which makes it less attractive to divert funds today and thus increases the amount of
funds depositors are willing to entrust to the ﬁnancial intermediary.18
Using (15), I can re-write the law of motion for the banker’s net worth as follows:
n˜jt+1 = [(rkt+1 − rt+1)
ηt
λ− νt
+ (1 + rt+1)]njt (17)
The sensitivity of net worth of the ﬁnancial intermediary j at t+1 to the ex-post realization
of the premium rkt+1 − rt+1 increases in the leverage ratio.
Proposition 4 Banks have an identical leverage ratio as none of its components depends on
bank-specific factors.
Proof : From (17), one can obtain the following:
njt+1
njt
= [(rkt+1 − rt+1)
ηt
λ− νt
+ (1 + rt+1)] (18)
qt+1sjt+1
qtsjt
=
ηt+1
λ−νt+1
ηt
λ−νt
njt+1
njt
(19)
The expressions above show that banks have identical expected growth rates of assets and
18The amount of deposits at banks does directly depend on banks’ net worth. In good times banks’ net worth
is relatively high and depositors believe that bankers do not misbehave in terms of managing their funds properly.
In these times, credit spreads can be fully explained by observed bankruptcies and intermediation costs. However,
in bad times, banks experience substantial declines in their net worth and depositors are hesitant about putting
their money in banks. In these times, the financial sector operates at a less efficient level and a smaller number
of investment projects are funded. Large credit spread observed in these times can be explained by the above
factors plus the inefficiency in the banking system.
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net worth, thus have identical leverage ratios.19
By using Proposition 4, we can sum demand for assets across j to obtain the total interme-
diary demand for assets:
qtst =
ηt
λ− νt
nt (20)
where st is the aggregate amount of assets held by ﬁnancial intermediaries and nt is the aggregate
intermediary net worth. In the equilibrium of the model, movements in the leverage ratio of
ﬁnancial ﬁrms and/or in their net worth will generate ﬂuctuations in total intermediary assets.
The aggregate intermediary net worth at the beginning of period t + 1 (before the net
worth shock hits but after exit and entry), n˜t+1, is the sum of the net worth of surviving
ﬁnancial intermediaries from the previous period, n˜et+1, and the net worth of entering ﬁnancial
intermediaries, n˜nt+1. Thus, we have
n˜t+1 = n˜et+1 + n˜nt+1 (21)
Since the fraction θ of the ﬁnancial intermediaries at time t will survive until time t + 1,
their net worth, n˜et+1, is given by
n˜et+1 = θ[(rkt+1 − rt+1)
ηt
λ− νt
+ (1 + rt+1)]nt (22)
Newly entering ﬁnancial intermediaries receive start-up funds from their respective house-
holds. The start-up funds are assumed to be a transfer equal to a fraction of the net worth
of exiting bankers. The total ﬁnal period net worth of exiting bankers at time t is equal to
(1− θ)nt. The household is assumed to transfer the fraction
ǫ
(1−θ) of the total ﬁnal period net
worth to its newly entering ﬁnancial intermediaries. Therefore, we have
n˜nt+1 = ǫnt (23)
Using (21), (22), and (23), we obtain the following law of motion for n˜t+1:
n˜t+1 = θ[(rkt+1 − rt+1)
ηt
λ− νt
+ (1 + rt+1)]nt + ǫnt (24)
19This immediately implies that ηt and νt are independent of j. In Appendix B.1, I use this result in explicit
derivation of ηt and νt.
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3.3 Firms
There is a continuum of unit mass of ﬁrms that produce the ﬁnal output in the economy. The
production technology at time t is described by the constant returns to scale function:
Yt = ztF (Kt,Ht) = ztK
α
t H
1−α
t (25)
where Kt is the ﬁrm’s capital stock, Ht is the ﬁrm’s hiring of labor and zt is an aggregate TFP
realization.
Firms acquire capital Kt+1 at the end of period t to produce the ﬁnal output in the next
period. After producing at time t+ 1, the ﬁrm can sell the capital on the open market.
Firms ﬁnance their capital expenditures in each period by issuing equities and selling them
to ﬁnancial intermediaries. Firms issue st units of state-contingent claims (equity), which is
equal to the number of units of capital acquired Kt+1. The ﬁnancial contract between a ﬁnancial
intermediary and a ﬁrm is an equity contract (or equivalently, a state contingent debt contract).
The ﬁrm pays a state-contingent interest rate equal to the ex-post return on capital rkt+1 to
the ﬁnancial intermediary. The ﬁrms set their capital demand Kt+1 taking this stochastic
repayment into consideration. At the beginning of period t+1 (after shocks are realized), when
output becomes available, ﬁrms obtain resources Yt+1 and use them to make repayments to
shareholders (or ﬁnancial intermediaries). The ﬁrm prices each ﬁnancial claim at the price of a
unit of capital, qt. Thus, we have
qtst = qtKt+1 (26)
There are no frictions for ﬁrms in obtaining funds from ﬁnancial intermediaries. The bank
has perfect information about the ﬁrm and there is perfect enforcement. Therefore, in the
current model, only banks face endogenous borrowing constraints in obtaining funds. These
constraints directly aﬀect the supply of funds to the ﬁrms.
Firms choose the labor demand at time t as follows:
wt = ztFH(Kt,Ht) (27)
Then ﬁrms pay out the ex-post return to capital to the banks given that they earn zero
proﬁt state by state. Therefore, ex-post return to capital is given by
rkt+1 =
zt+1FK(Kt+1,Ht+1) + qt+1(1− δ)
qt
− 1 (28)
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Labor demand condition (27) simply states that the wage rate is equal to the marginal
product of labor. Moreover, condition (28) states that the ex-post real rate of return on capital
is equal to the marginal product of capital plus the capital gain from changed prices.
3.4 Capital Producers
Following the literature on ﬁnancial accelerator, I incorporate capital producers into the model
in order to introduce capital adjustment costs in a tractable way. Capital adjustment costs are
needed to introduce some variation in the price of capital; otherwise the price of capital will
not respond to the changes in capital stock and will always be equal to 1.20
I assume that households own capital producers and receive any proﬁts. At the end of period
t, competitive capital producers buy capital from ﬁrms to repair the depreciated capital and to
build new capital. Then they sell both the new and repaired capital. The cost of replacing the
depreciated capital is unity; thus the price of a unit of new capital or repaired capital is qt. The
proﬁt maximization problem of the capital producers is given by:
max
It
qtKt+1 − qt(1− δ)Kt − It (29)
s.t. Kt+1 = (1− δ)Kt +Φ
(
It
Kt
)
Kt (30)
where It) is the total investment by capital producing ﬁrms and Φ
(
It
Kt
)
is the capital adjustment
cost function. The resulting optimality condition gives the following “Q” relation for investment:
qt =
[
Φ
′
(
It
Kt
)]
−1
(31)
where Φ
′
(
It
Kt
)
is the partial derivative of the capital adjustment cost function with respect
to investment-capital ratio at time t. The ﬂuctuations in investment expenditures will create
variation in the price of capital. A fall in investment at time t (ceteris paribus) will reduce the
price of capital in the same period.
I leave the deﬁnition of the competitive equilibrium of the model to Appendix C.
20There will be no financial accelerator between households and banks if there is no variation in the price of
capital.
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4 Quantitative Analysis
This section studies the quantitative predictions of the model by examining the results of nu-
merical simulations of an economy calibrated to quarterly U.S. data. In order to investigate the
dynamics of the model, I compute a second-order approximation to the equilibrium conditions
using Dynare.
4.1 Functional Forms, Parametrization and Calibration
The quantitative analysis uses the following functional forms for preferences, production tech-
nology and capital adjustment costs:21
U(c, 1 − L) = log(c) + υ(1− L) (32)
F (K,H) = KαH1−α (33)
Φ
(
I
K
)
=
I
K
−
ϕ
2
[
I
K
− δ
]2
(34)
Table 4 lists the parameter values for the model economy. The preference and production
parameters are standard in business cycle literature. I take the quarterly discount factor, β as
0.9942 to match the 2.37% average annualized real deposit rate in the U.S. I pick the relative
utility weight of labor υ as 1.72 to ﬁx hours worked in steady state, L, at one third of the
available time. The share of capital in the production function is set to 0.36 to match the
labor share of income in the U.S. data. The capital adjustment cost parameter is taken so as
to match the relative volatility of price of investment goods with respect to output in the U.S.
data.22 The quarterly depreciation rate of capital is set to 2.25% to match the average annual
investment to capital ratio.
The non-standard parameters in our model are the ﬁnancial sector parameters: the fraction
of the revenues that can be diverted, λ, the proportional transfer to newly entering bankers,
ǫ, and the survival probability of bankers, θ. I set ǫ to 0.001 so that the proportional trans-
fer to newly entering bankers is 0.1% of aggregate net worth.23 I pick other two parameters
21I choose the functional form of the capital adjustment cost following Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999),
Gertler, Gilchrist, and Natalucci (2007) etc.
22The volatility of price of investment goods is taken from Gomme et al. (2011).
23I keep the proportional transfer to newly entering bankers small, so that it does not have significant impact
on the results.
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Table 3: Model Parameterization and Calibration
Description Parameter Value Target Data
Preferences
Quarterly discount factor β 0.9942 Annualized real deposit rate 2.37%
Relative utility weight of leisure υ 1.7167 Hours worked 0.3333
Production Technology
Share of capital in output α 0.36 Labor share of output 0.64
Capital adjustment cost parameter ϕ 3.6 Relative volatility of price of investment 0.37
Depreciation rate of capital δ 0.025 Average annual ratio of investment to capital 10%
Steady-state total factor productivity z 1 Normalization N/A
Financial Intermediaries
Steady-state fraction of assets that can be diverted λ 0.1548 Commercial and industrial loan spread 0.46%
Proportional transfer to the entering bankers ǫ 0.001 0.1% of aggregate net worth N/A
Survival probability of the bankers θ 0.9685 Leverage ratio of commercial banks 4.62
Steady-state level of net worth shock ω 1 Normalization N/A
Shock Processes
Persistence of TFP process ρz 0.9315 Quarterly persistence of TFP process 0.9315
Standard deviation of productivity shock σz 0.006424 Quarterly standard dev. of TFP shock 0.0064
Persistence of ω process ρω 0.3744 Quarterly persistence of ω process 0.3744
Standard deviation of net worth shock σω 0.0512 Quarterly standard dev. of net worth shock 0.0512
simultaneously to match the following two targets: an average interest rate spread of 46 basis
points, which is the historical average of the diﬀerence between the quarterly commercial and
industrial loan spread and the quarterly deposit rate from 1987.Q1 to 2010.Q4, and an average
leverage ratio of 4.61, which is the historical average of U.S. commercial banks’ leverage ratio
for the same period. The resulting values for λ and θ are 0.155 and 0.968, respectively.
Finally, turning to the shock processes, I follow the standard Solow residuals approach to
construct the series for productivity shocks. Using the production function, I obtain
zt =
yt
Kαt H
1−α
t
(35)
Using the empirical series for output, yt, capital, Kt, and labor, Ht, I use equation (51) to
obtain the zt series. Then I construct the log-deviation of TFP series by linearly detrending the
log of the zt series over the period 1987.Q1-2010.Q4.
Similar to the construction of productivity shocks, ωt series are constructed from the law of
motion for bank net worth, which is given by
ωt =
1
θ[(rkt+1 − rt+1)
ηt
λ−νt
+ (1 + rt+1)] + ǫ
n˜t+1
n˜t
(36)
Using the empirical series for net worth, nt, credit spread, rkt+1 − rt+1, leverage,
ηt
λ−νt
, and
gross deposit rate 1 + rt+1, I use equation (52) obtain the ωt series.
24 Then I construct the
24I constructed two ω series by using the realized and the expected values of credit spread. I obtain the expected
value of credit spread by regressing actual spread on real and financial variables (such as GDP, consumption,
investment, hours, bank credit, deposits, net worth) and getting the predicted value of it. Both series of ω are
very similar to each other (the correlation between the two series is 0.9934).
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Figure 2: Time Series of Shocks to Productivity and Credit Conditions
log-deviation of ωt series by linearly detrending the log of these series over the period 1987.Q1-
2010.Q4. The innovations to ωt are net worth shocks.
After constructing the zt and ωt series over the period 1987.Q1-2010.Q4, I estimate two
independent AR(1) processes for both series:
log(zt+1) = ρzlog(zt) + ǫ
z
t+1 (37)
log(ωt+1) = ρωlog(ωt) + ǫ
ω
t+1 (38)
where ǫz,t+1 and ǫω,t+1 are i.i.d. with standard deviations σz and σω, respectively. The resulting
parameters are ρz = 0.93, ρω = 0.37, σz = 0.0064, and σω = 0.05.
The ﬁrst two panels of Figure 2 plot the variables zt and ωt constructed using the procedures
described above. The ﬁgures show that the levels of productivity and credit conditions fell
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sharply in the recent recession. The bottom panels plot the innovations ǫz,t and ǫω,t. These
innovations are unexpected changes in the levels of productivity and ﬁnancial conditions. The
plots suggest that the U.S. economy is severely hit by both negative productivity and ﬁnancial
shocks in the Great Recession.
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Figure 3: Long-run equilibrium as a function of fraction of diverted funds by bankers
4.2 Long-Run Equilibrium of the Model
This section presents the deterministic steady-state properties of the model economy. First,
I will formally show how the tightness of bank capital constraint aﬀects output. Imposing
the steady-state on the competitive equilibrium conditions of the model economy yields the
following analytical expression for output:
y =

 α
(1−βθ)µλ
(1−θ)β(1+µ) +
(1−β)
β
+ δ


1
(1−α)
L
2−α
(39)
where µ is the Lagrange multiplier of bank capital constraint. Taking the partial derivative of
output w.r.t. µ, I obtain
22
∂y
∂µ
= −
α
(1− α)

 α
(1−βθ)µλ
(1−θ)β(1+µ) +
(1−β)
β
+ δ


α
(1−α)
L
2−α
[
(1− θ)β(1− βθ)λ
[(1− θ)β(1 + µ)]2
]
−2
< 0 (40)
which unambiguously shows that the output will be lower the larger µ. The reason is simple.
As the bank capital constraint gets tighter, the credit spread will be larger, as can be seen from
the following expression.
(rk − r) =
(1− βθ)µλ
(1− θ)β(1 + µ)
(41)
The term at the right-hand side of equation (57) appears as a positive wedge in the intertemporal
Euler equation, which determines how deposits (savings) are transformed into credit to ﬁrms
in the economy. This positive wedge reduces the amount of savings that can be extended as
credit to non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms, lowering their physical capital accumulation, and thus leading to a
lower steady-state output. The same mechanism is also at work when shocks move the economy
around the steady-state as they tighten or relax the bank capital constraint.
Second, I analytically show how output is aﬀected by the severity of credit frictions in
banking sector, which is governed by the fraction of diverted funds by bankers, λ. Taking the
partial derivative of output w.r.t. λ, I get
∂y
∂λ
= −
αL
2−α
(1− α)

 α
[
(1−βθ)[(1−ǫ)β−θ]
(1−θ)β(1−ǫ)β
] (1−α)
α
(1−βθ)[(1−ǫ)β−θ]λ
(1−θ)β(1−ǫ)β +
(1−β)+βδ
β


α
(1−α) [
(1− βθ)[(1− ǫ)β − θ]λ
(1− θ)β(1− ǫ)β
+
(1− β) + βδ
β
]
−2
< 0
(42)
which implies that the steady-state output will be lower the higher the intensity of ﬁnancial
frictions in banking sector. In order to get the intuition behind this result, I display long-run
equilibria of real and ﬁnancial variables as a function of the intensity of the credit friction in the
ﬁnancial sector given by fraction of diverted funds by bankers, λ. All other parameter values
are set to those shown in Table 3. Figure 3 shows that the long-run dynamics of the model
economy to changes in λ is monotonic and non-linear. As λ increases, households’ incentive to
make deposits into banks falls since the bankers’ gain from diverting funds rises. Banks have
to ﬁnance their equity investment by internal ﬁnancing rather than external ﬁnancing. Thus,
deposits go down and net worth rises, leading to a fall in banks’ leverage ratio. The decline
in leverage ratio is sharper than the rise in net worth, inducing a drop in total credit to non-
ﬁnancial ﬁrms. Credit conditions tighten for ﬁrms and their cost of funds given by credit spread
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goes up. This leads to a reduction in investment and output falls.
4.3 Intermediary Capital and the Transmission of Shocks
I present the dynamics of the model in response to productivity and net worth shocks. In the
ﬁgures below, credit spread, return to capital, and deposit rate are expressed in percentage
points per annum. The responses of all other variables are expressed in percentage deviations
from their respective steady state values.
Figure 4 presents the impulse responses to a one-time, one-standard deviation negative
shock to TFP. The negative technology shock reduces the price of investment goods produced
by capital producers by 0.3% on impact, lowering the value of ﬁrms’ shares. This makes purchase
of their shares less proﬁtable for banks, which can also be observed from the 1.2% fall in the
return to capital. Thus, banks have diﬃculty in obtaining deposits from households since their
equity investment becomes less attractive. This reduces the return to deposits by 0.2%, inducing
a countercyclical credit spread. The spread rises by 0.3% on impact. In order to compensate the
fall in their external ﬁnancing, banks need to ﬁnance a larger share of their purchases of equities
from their net worth. However, bank net worth also falls by 4% due to lower asset prices. Since
the decline in net worth is sharper than the fall in deposits on impact, banks’ leverage ratio
rises. Hence, the model with productivity shocks generates a countercyclical leverage ratio.
Because banks cannot adjust their net worth immediately and the lower price of capital reduces
the value of their net worth, their ﬁnancing conditions tighten and bank lending in the form of
equity purchases falls dramatically (by about 4.6%), inducing aggregate investment to shrink
by 0.9%. Finally, hours fall by 0.15%, and output declines by 1.2%.
Figure 5 presents the impulse responses to a one-time, one-standard deviation negative shock
to net worth. The negative net worth shock immediately reduces net worth of banks. Bank
net worth falls roughly by 15% on impact. In order to compensate the decline in their internal
ﬁnancing, they need to ﬁnance a larger share of their purchases of equities from deposits. This
induces a rise in their leverage ratio. Hence, the model driven by net worth shocks also generates
a countercyclical leverage ratio. Although they have to ﬁnance a greater fraction of their equity
investment from deposits, their ability to do so is impaired by the fall in their net worth,
leading deposits to decline after ﬁve quarters. Moreover, the fall in their net worth translates
into a reduction in bank credit to ﬁrms. Bank credit shrinks by roughly 8% on impact. Since
ﬁrms ﬁnance their capital expenditures via bank credit, they cut back their investment severely
(by about 2%). The drop in investment reduces the price of capital by 0.4%, which lowers
24
banks’ net worth further. Hours fall by 0.4% and output drops by 0.9% on impact. Finally,
consumption rises on impact after the shock hits, which is what was observed at the beginning
of the recent ﬁnancial crisis. In the context of the model, this seemingly unappealing result
can be explained as follows: On the intratemporal margin, the fall in aggregate demand caused
by lower investment expenditures translates into a reduction in the demand for labor, which
eventually leads to a drop in hours worked. Since wages are ﬂexible, the reduction in labor
demand also lowers wages, leading to a fall in households’ wage bill. However, the rise in credit
spread on impact raises banks’ proﬁts. Since households own banks, the rise in their proﬁts
helps households sustain their consumption after the ﬁnancial shock hits. On impact, the rise
in bank proﬁts dominates the reduction in wage bill, pushing consumption up.25
25Barro and King (1984) argue that any shock that reduces the quantity of hours worked on impact has to lead
a fall in consumption due to consumption-leisure optimality condition. Ajello (2010) shows that sticky wages are
the key factor in generating a positive comovement between consumption and investment after a financial shock.
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Figure 4: Impulse responses to a negative one-standard-deviation productivity shock
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Figure 5: Impulse responses to a negative one-standard-deviation net worth shock
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4.4 Business Cycle Dynamics
This section presents numerical results from stochastic simulations of the benchmark economy
with productivity and net worth shocks. First, I simulate the model economy 1000 times for
1096 periods each and discard the ﬁrst 1000 periods in each simulation so that each simulation
has the same length as the data sample. I then compute the standard business cycle statistics
using the cyclical components of the HP-ﬁltered series. I also conduct the same quantitative
exercise for the frictionless version of the benchmark economy, which is essentially the standard
RBC model with capital adjustment costs, in order to compare the real ﬂuctuations in both
models. Finally, I simulate the model economy only driven by productivity shocks to see the
contribution of net worth shocks to the observed dynamics of real and ﬁnancial variables.
Table 4 presents quarterly real and ﬁnancial statistics in the data and in the model economies.
In particular, it displays the relative standard deviations of real and ﬁnancial variables with
respect to output and their cross-correlations with output. Column 3 of the table shows that
the standard RBC model with capital adjustment costs driven by standard productivity shocks
is able produce the key business cycle facts in the U.S. data as expected: consumption and
hours less volatile than output, while investment is more volatile, all real variables are highly
procyclical. However, this model can only explain 80% of the ﬂuctuations in output and less
than half of the relative volatility in hours. It also generates roughly perfect positive corre-
lation between real variables and output, contrary to the data. Moreover, this model has no
predictions about ﬁnancial variables.
Column 4 of the table shows the business cycle statistics of our model economy with only
productivity shocks. This model is much closer to the data in terms of real ﬂuctuations, com-
pared to the RBC model. It now accounts for 85% of the ﬂuctuations in output and roughly half
of the relative volatility in hours. The model is also able to replicate most of the stylized facts
about ﬁnancial variables: bank assets, deposits and loan spread is less volatile than output,
while net worth and leverage ratio are more volatile; bank assets and net worth are procycli-
cal, while leverage ratio and loan spread are countercyclical. However, it generates procyclical
deposits, contrary to the data. Although the model does a good job in terms of key facts of
ﬁnancial variables, it predicts lower ﬂuctuations. For example, it can explain less than half
of the relative volatility in bank assets, roughly half of the relative volatility in deposits, less
than one third of the relative volatility in net worth and leverage ratio. The model virtually
matches the relative volatility of credit spread. Column 5 of the table shows the real and ﬁ-
nancial statistics in the benchmark economy driven by both shocks. This model is even closer
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Table 4: Real and Financial Statistics
Statistic Data RBC Only Productivity Benchmark
σY 1.80 1.44 1.53 1.81
σC 0.45 0.41 0.39 0.75
σI 2.73 2.45 2.98 4.64
σL 0.91 0.40 0.46 0.84
ρY,I 0.97 1.00 0.98 0.87
ρY,C 0.82 0.97 0.85 -0.03
ρY,L 0.83 0.99 0.96 0.81
σAssets 0.93 – 0.40 0.58
σDeposits 0.69 – 0.39 0.87
σNetWorth 5.17 – 1.36 5.90
σLeverageR. 5.61 – 1.40 6.40
σSpread 0.08 – 0.07 0.23
ρY,Assets 0.30 – 0.90 0.88
ρY,Deposits -0.39 – 0.46 -0.23
ρY,NetWorth 0.52 – 0.87 0.68
ρY,LeverageR. -0.49 – -0.71 -0.59
ρY,Spread -0.39 – -0.86 -0.67
a Business cycle statistics in the table are based on HP-filtered cyclical components of quarterly simulated time series
(smoothing parameter:1600).
b The standard deviation of output is expressed in percent; standard deviations of the remaining variables are normalized
by the standard deviation of output (std(x)/std(GDP)).
c In all model economies, capital adjustment cost parameter is set to 3.3, which is calibrated in benchmark model to
match the relative volatility of price of investment.
to the data than the previous model in terms of business cycle properties of real variables. It
predicts all of the ﬂuctuations in output, almost all of the relative volatility in hours. The
cross correlations of investment and hours with output are quite inline with the data. However,
the model generates acyclical consumption. This model has better predictions about ﬁnancial
variables. It is able to reproduce the key facts about aggregate ﬁnancial variables. Moreover, it
now explains more than half of the relative volatility in bank assets, and somewhat overpredicts
the relative volatility in other ﬁnancial variables. The last column of Table 1 establishes the
ﬁrst main result of the paper: the benchmark model driven by both shocks is able to deliver
most of the key stylized facts about real and ﬁnancial variables simultaneously.
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Figure 6: Real Fluctuations: Benchmark vs. RBC model
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I also study the dynamics of the model in response to the actual sequence of shocks to see
whether the model is able to generate the real and ﬁnancial cycles observed in the U.S. data.26
I basically feed the actual innovations to zt and ωt into the model and compute the responses
of real and ﬁnancial variables over the period 1987 to 2010.
Figure 6 displays the quarterly time series of output, investment and hours in the data, in
the standard RBC model with capital adjustment costs, and in the benchmark economy. The
RBC model is driven by standard productivity shocks, while the benchmark model is driven by
both shocks. Both the quarterly times series of the variables and their model counterparts are
log-linearly detrended over the period 1987.Q1 - 2010.Q4, and plotted in percentage deviations
from their trends. The correlations between the actual and the model-simulated series are also
reported in the graphs. The ﬁgure suggests that both the RBC model and the benchmark econ-
omy generate series of real variables that closely follow their empirical counterparts. However,
the RBC model predicts lower ﬂuctuations in all real variables. In particular, the RBC model
predicts a smaller decline in output in the 1990-91 recession. Moreover, it generates declines
in investment and hours that are smaller than the actual declines in the 1990-91 and 2007-09
recessions. On the other hand, the benchmark model generates larger ﬂuctuations in real vari-
ables, consistent with the data. Since this model has one additional shock compared to the
RBC model, higher volatility can be expected. However, the benchmark model also improves
upon the RBC model in the sense that for all real variables, the cross-correlations between
the data and the benchmark model is much higher than those between the data and the RBC
model. Moreover, the model’s success in generating empirically-relevant ﬂuctuations in hours
hinges on the fact that it is able to produce quantitatively reasonable ﬂuctuations in capital.
Since labor is complementary to capital stock in a standard Cobb-Douglas production function,
empirically-relevant changes in capital stock lead to observed ﬂuctuations in hours.
Figure 7 displays the quarterly time series of output, investment and hours in the data,
in the model driven only by productivity shocks, and in the benchmark economy. The ﬁgure
suggests that the benchmark economy performs better than the model with only productivity
shocks in terms of both volatilities of real variables and cross-correlations of those variables
with the data. For all the real variables, the cross-correlations with the data in the benchmark
model is higher than those with the data in the model with only productivity shocks.
Figure 8 displays the quarterly time series of output, investment and hours in the data, in
the RBC model, and in the model driven only by productivity shocks. This ﬁgure suggests that
26Although I feed the actual series of shocks into the model, they are not perfectly anticipated by the agents
in the economy as they predict future values of zt and ωt using the AR(1) processes given by (53) and (54).
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Figure 7: Real Fluctuations: Benchmark vs. Only Productivity
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the model with only productivity shocks is not very diﬀerent from the RBC model in terms of
its quantitative performance in real variables. Actually, the series of real variables generated by
these two models are almost the same. Therefore, we can say that credit frictions in banking
sector by themselves are not enough to improve upon the RBC model and to produce real
ﬂuctuations consistent with the data. Financial shocks are quite important in explaining the
observed dynamics of real variables.
Figure 9 shows the quarterly time series of bank credit, deposits, net worth, leverage ratio,
and credit spread both in the data, in the model driven only by productivity shocks and in
the benchmark model. Both the quarterly time series of ﬁnancial variables and their model
counterparts are log-linearly detrended over the period 1987.Q1 - 2010.Q4, and plotted in per-
centage deviations from their trends. Credit spread is plotted in annualized percentages. The
correlations between the actual and the model-simulated series are also reported in the graphs.
For all the ﬁnancial variables, the cross-correlations with the data in the benchmark model is
signiﬁcantly higher than those with the data in the model with only productivity shocks. Specif-
ically, for net worth, leverage ratio and credit spread, the benchmark model produces highly
positively correlated series with the data, while the model with only productivity shocks predicts
negative correlations. Thus, this ﬁgure suggests that ﬁnancial shocks contribute signiﬁcantly to
explaining the observed dynamics of ﬁnancial variables.
Figure 10 plots the ﬂuctuations in the Lagrange multiplier of bank capital constraint in the
benchmark model and those in the index of credit tightness constructed by Federal Reserve
Board using the Senior Loan Oﬃcer Opinion Survey on Bank Lending Practices. Starting with
the second quarter of 1990, this survey basically asks senior loan oﬃcers whether they have
recently tighten the credit standards for commercial and industrial loans, and the collected
responses are used to create an index of credit tightness as the percentage of respondents,
reporting tightening standards. Increases in both the multiplier and the index show the adverse
changes in bank lending to non-ﬁnancial businesses. The ﬁgure shows that the multiplier tracks
the index well. The multiplier also explains the severity of credit conditions experienced by the
U.S. economy in the last three recessions by capturing almost most of the ﬂuctuations in the
index. This ﬁgure establishes the second main result of the paper: U.S. banks experienced a
signiﬁcant deterioration in their lending ability in the last recessions, especially in 1990-91 and
2007-09 recessions.
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Figure 9: Financial Fluctuations: Benchmark vs. Only Productivity
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5 Conclusion
This paper quantitatively investigates the joint role of ﬁnancial shocks and credit frictions
aﬀecting banking sector in driving the real and ﬁnancial ﬂuctuations in the data. To this end, I
ﬁrst characterize the empirical cyclical behavior of aggregate ﬁnancial variables of U.S. banking
sector. I then use an otherwise standard real business cycle model with a simple ﬁnancial sector,
which features an agency problem between banks and their depositors, leading to endogenous
borrowing constraints for banks in obtaining funds from households. I incorporate empirically-
disciplined shocks to bank net worth (i.e. “ﬁnancial shocks”) which aﬀect the ability of banks
to obtain funds from households and to extend credit to non-ﬁnancial sector.The time series
of ﬁnancial shocks are constructed from the data. The resulting shock series show that credit
conditions in the U.S. economy deteriorated signiﬁcantly in the recent recession.
Several key ﬁndings emerge from the quantitative analysis. First, the benchmark model
driven by both productivity and ﬁnancial shocks is able to explain most of the empirical facts
about real and ﬁnancial variables simultaneously. Second, ﬁnancial shocks to banking sector
contribute signiﬁcantly not only to the observed dynamics of aggregate ﬁnancial variables but
also to the observed dynamics of standard macroeconomic variables. In particular, the bench-
mark model has better predictions about real and ﬁnancial variables than the model driven
only by productivity shocks. Third, the simulation of the benchmark model points a signiﬁcant
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worsening in banks’ lending ability in 1990-91 and 2007-09 recessions. The main transmission
mechanism of ﬁnancial shocks is through bank capital channel. In particular, ﬁnancial shocks
are transmitted to the real economy through tightening bank capital constraint, which eventu-
ally leads to rising credit spread. Non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms perceive this rise in credit spread as an
increase in their cost of borrowing from banks, leading to a decline in their external ﬁnance
for investment expenditures. Falling aggregate demand caused by lower investment reduces the
demand for labor, which brings a drop in hours worked, and hence output.
For further research, one can investigate the normative implications of the model in the light
of the recent ﬁnancial crisis, as U.S. government has assisted many ﬁnancial ﬁrms in order to
raise their franchise value, and hence to support real economic activity. In order to start thinking
about how diﬀerent policy tools can be implemented in an environment in which the ﬁnancial
sector is crucial for business cycle ﬂuctuations and what the welfare implications of these policies
are, I need a model capable of matching real and ﬁnancial ﬂuctuations simultaneously. I think
that the model proposed in this paper is quite successful in this dimension.
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Appendix A: Data Appendix
Quarterly seasonally-adjusted data on standard macroeconomic variables except Hours are
taken from the Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED) of St. Louis FED. Hours data are
taken from Current Employment Statistics survey published by the Bureau of Labor Statis-
tics. GDP deﬂator from NIPA accounts is used to deﬂate the time series of the nominal macro
aggregates. Consumption is the sum of “Personal consumption expenditures on nondurables”
(PCND) and “Personal consumption expenditures on services”. Investment is the sum of “Per-
sonal consumption expenditures on durables” (PCDG) and “Gross private domestic investment”
(GPDI). GDP is the sum of Consumption and Investment. Hours is computed as the multipli-
cation of “average weekly hours in private sector” with “average number of workers in private
sector”. Quarterly time series of capital stock to obtain zt series are constructed using the
approach described in the online appendix of Jermann and Quadrini (2010).
Quarterly ﬁnancial time series of Bank assets and Bank liabilities are constructed using the
monthly data on Assets and Liabilities of Commercial Banks in the U.S. from Data Download
Program of Statistical & Historical Database of the Federal Reserve Board. Financial data
at the FED board are seasonally-adjusted but nominal. GDP deﬂator from NIPA accounts
is used to deﬂate the ﬁnancial time series. Bank assets are bank credit at the asset side of
the balance sheet of the U.S. commercial banks. Bank liabilities are deposits held at the U.S.
commercial banks. Quarterly time series of Loan spread are taken from Survey of Terms of
Business Lending from Statistical & Historical Database of the FED Board. Loan spread is
commercial and industrial loan spread over intended federal funds rate. Quarterly deposit rates
are constructed using monthly data on 3-month certiﬁcate of deposit secondary market rate
from FRED. The inﬂation rate computed from GDP deﬂator is used to make nominal deposit
rate data real.
42
Appendix B
B.1. Proof of Proposition 1
Let’s conjecture that the bank’s franchise value is given by
Vjt = νtqtsjt + ηtnt (43)
Comparing the conjectured solution for Vjt to the expected discounted terminal net worth yields
the following expressions,
νtqtsjt = Et
∞∑
i=0
(1− θ)θiβi+1Λt,t+1+i[(rkt+1+i − rt+1+i)qt+isjt+i] (44)
ηtnjt = Et
∞∑
i=0
(1− θ)θiβi+1Λt,t+1+i(1 + rt+1+i)njt+i (45)
I write νt and ηt recursively using the expression above. Let’s begin with νt. To ease the
notation, let’s drop expectations for now.
νt =
∞∑
i=0
(1− θ)θiβi+1Λt,t+1+i [(rkt+1+i − rt+1+i)xt,t+i] (46)
where xt,t+i =
qt+isjt+i
qtsjt
.
νt = (1− θ)βΛt,t+1(rkt+1 − rt+1) +
∞∑
i=1
(1− θ)θiβi+1Λt,t+1+i [(rkt+1+i − rt+1+i)xt,t+i] (47)
νt = (1−θ)βΛt,t+1(rkt+1−rt+1)+βΛt,t+1θxt,t+1
∞∑
i=0
(1−θ)θi+1βi+1Λt+1,t+2+i [(rkt+2+i − rt+2+i)xt+1,t+1+i]
(48)
The inﬁnite sum at the right-hand side of equation (64) is one period updated version of equation
(62), given by
νt+1 =
∞∑
i=0
(1− θ)θi+1βi+1Λt+1,t+2+i [(rkt+2+i − rt+2+i)xt+1,t+1+i] (49)
where xt+1,t+1+i =
qt+1+isjt+1+i
qt+1sjt+1
.
Hence, we can re-write (64) with the expectations as follows:
νt = Et[(1− θ)βΛt,t+1(rkt+1 − rt+1) + βΛt,t+1θxt,t+1νt+1] (50)
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Let’s continue with ηt. To ease the notation, let’s drop expectations for now.
ηt =
∞∑
i=0
(1− θ)θiβi+1Λt,t+1+i(1 + rt+1+i)zt,t+i (51)
where zt,t+i =
njt+i
njt
ηt = (1− θ)βΛt,t+1(1 + rt+1) +
∞∑
i=1
(1− θ)θiβi+1Λt,t+1+i(1 + rt+1+i)zt,t+i (52)
ηt = (1− θ)βΛt,t+1(1 + rt+1) + βΛt,t+1θzt,t+1
∞∑
i=0
(1− θ)θi+1βi+1Λt+1,t+2+i(1 + rt+2+i)zt+1,t+1+i
(53)
The inﬁnite sum at the right-hand size of equation (69) is one period updated version of equation
(67), given by
ηt+1 =
∞∑
i=1
(1− θ)θi+1βi+1Λt+1,t+2+i(1 + rt+2+i)zt+1,t+1+i (54)
where zt+1,t+1+i =
njt+1+i
njt+1
Hence, we can re-write equation (69) with the expectations as follows:
ηt = Et[(1− θ)βΛt,t+1(1 + rt+1) + βΛt,t+1θzt,t+1ηt+1] (55)
B.2. Proof of Proposition 2
The proﬁt maximization problem by a representative bank is given by
Vjt = max
sjt
Et
∞∑
i=0
(1− θ)θiβi+1Λt,t+1+i[(rkt+1+i − rt+1+i)qt+isjt+i + (1 + rt+1+i)njt+i] (56)
s.t. Vjt ≥ λqtsjt (µt) (57)
where µt is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the incentive compatibility constraint. Using
the solution for Vjt in Proposition 2, I can re-write the intermediary’s maximization problem
using the Lagrangian,
 L = νtqtsjt + ηtnjt + µt[νtqtsjt + ηtnjt − λqtsjt] (58)
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The ﬁrst order conditions w.r.t. sjt and µt are given respectively by
(1 + µt)νtqt = µtλqt (59)
Vjt − λqtsjt = 0 (60)
Rearranging (75) gives us the following expression,
νt =
µtλ
(1 + µt)
(61)
Therefore, we establish that the incentive compatibility constraint binds (µt > 0) as long as
expected discounted marginal gain of increasing bank assets is positive. Replacing the deﬁnition
of νt, we obtain
Et[(1 − θ)βΛt,t+1(rkt+1 − rt+1) + βΛt,t+1θ
qt+1sjt+1
qtsjt
νt+1] =
µtλ
(1 + µt)
(62)
Imposing the steady-state, we get the following expression,
(1− θ)β(rk − r)
(1− βθ)
=
µλ
(1 + µ)
(63)
Rearranging gives us
(rk − r) =
(1− βθ)µλ
(1− θ)β(1 + µ)
(64)
As long as µ is positive, i.e. the incentive compatibility constraint binds, risk premium is
positive. Since I solve the model using linear approximation around the steady-state and the
shocks are suﬃciently small, the premium is always positive in numerical simulations.
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Appendix C: Competitive Equilibrium
A competitive equilibrium of this model economy consists of sequences of allocations {ct, Lt,
Kt+1, st, nt, n˜t, It, ηt, νt,Ht}
∞
t=0, of prices {wt, rkt+1, rt+1, qt}
∞
t=0 and of exogenous processes {zt, ωt}
∞
t=0
such that (i) the allocations solve the household’s, the ﬁrm’s and the ﬁnancial intermediary’s
problems at the equilibrium prices and (ii) markets for factor inputs clear. The following equi-
librium conditions must be satisﬁed:
Ul(t)
Uc(t)
= wt (65)
Uc(t) = β(1 + rt+1)EtUc(t+ 1) (66)
rkt+1 =
zt+1FK(Kt+1,Ht+1) + qt+1(1− δ)
qt
− 1 (67)
wt = ztFH(Kt,Ht) (68)
nt = ωtn˜t (69)
qtst =
ηt
λ− νt
nt (70)
νt = Et[(1− θ)βΛt,t+1(rkt+1 − rt+1) + βΛt,t+1θ
qt+1st+1
qtst
νt+1] (71)
ηt = Et[(1− θ)βΛt,t+1(1 + rt+1) + βΛt,t+1θ
nt+1
nt
ηt+1] (72)
n˜t+1 = θ[(rkt+1 − rt+1)
ηt
λ− νt
+ (1 + rt+1)]nt + ǫnt (73)
qtst = qtKt+1 (74)
Kt+1 = (1− δ)Kt +Φ
(
It
Kt
)
Kt (75)
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qt =
[
Φ
′
(
It
Kt
)]
−1
(76)
Lt = Ht (77)
Ct + It = ztF (Kt,Ht) (78)
log(zt+1) = ρzlog(zt) + ǫ
z
t+1 (79)
log(ωt+1) = ρωlog(ωt) + ǫ
ω
t+1 (80)
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Appendix D: Business Cycle Statistics of Aggregate Financial
Variables of the whole U.S. Financial Sector
For interested readers, this section documents empirical cyclical properties of aggregate mea-
sures of the leverage ratio, debt and equity of U.S. ﬁnancial ﬁrms and of the credit spread using
quarterly data for the period 1952-2009. In particular, I compute standard business cycle statis-
tics of the aggregate ﬁnancial variables, such as their standard deviations, cross-correlations with
output.
I use quarterly balance sheet data from the Flow of Funds Accounts of the Federal Reserve
Board.27 The theoretical model described below treats the entire ﬁnancial intermediary sector as
a group of identical institutions although there is a considerable amount of heterogeneity among
ﬁnancial institutions in terms of both their functions and balance sheet structures. For example,
some ﬁnancial intermediaries such as private pension funds, mutual funds, retirement funds,
are ﬁnanced only by equity while some others such as banks, security-brokers and dealers use
leverage extensively. In order to be consistent with the model, I only select ﬁnancial institutions
that always carry some leverage.
I focus on both depository and non-depository ﬁnancial institutions. The depository in-
stitutions are U.S. chartered commercial banks, savings institutions, and credit unions. The
non-depository institutions are issuers of asset-backed securities, bank holding companies, se-
curity brokers and dealers, ﬁnance companies, insurance companies, funding corporations, and
real estate investment trusts. These institutions perform the majority of activity in the U.S.
ﬁnancial sector as measured by their total assets.28 Liabilities are deﬁned as the sum of “Total
liabilities” of each of the aforementioned depository and non-depository ﬁnancial institutions
in the U.S. ﬁnancial system, while Net Worth is deﬁned as the sum of “Total ﬁnancial assets”
minus the sum of “Total liabilities” of the same institutions. Leverage ratio is the ratio of
Liabilities to Net Worth. Credit spread measure I use is the diﬀerence between quarterly real
return to capital and quarterly real deposit rate. Quarterly real return to capital data are taken
from Gomme et.al. (2011). Quarterly deposit rate data is taken from Federal Reserve Economic
27Total financial assets and total liabilities in the Flow of Funds Accounts are partly measured at book values
and may be different from market values. The differences between book values and market values are more likely
to disappear when the balance sheet of a particular financial institution is marked to market and/or when total
financial assets or liabilities are short-term.
28The total assets of these institutions is 90% of the total assets of the U.S. financial sector. Moreover,
our definition of U.S. financial sector includes important marked based financial institutions such as security
broker&dealers, finance companies, asset backed security (ABS) issuers, and commercial banks as Adrian and Shin
(2009) suggest. They argue that the balance sheet fluctuations of these institutions are important determinants
of real fluctuations.
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Data (FRED) of St. Louis FED. I use quarterly inﬂation rate computed using GDP deﬂator to
make nominal deposit rates real.
Quarterly ﬁnancial data are taken from the Flow of Funds Accounts (FFA) of the Federal
Reserve Board. Quarterly real data except Hours and deposit rate data are taken from Federal
Reserve Economic Data (FRED) of St. Louis FED. Hours data are taken from Current Em-
ployment Statistics survey published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The return to capital
data are taken from Gomme et al. (2011). This paper constructs an empirical measure of
the return to capital for the U.S., which directly corresponds to the deﬁnition of the return to
capital in this paper. The balance sheet data in the level tables of FFA are nominal and are
not seasonally adjusted. All ﬁnancial data are seasonally adjusted using Census X12 and are
deﬂated using GDP deﬂator. I use FFA coded level tables released on March 10, 2011 when I
refer to the balance sheet items of ﬁnancial sector. Financial and real data sources for ﬁgures
1 and 2, and tables 1 and 2 are given below.
Liabilities are the sum of “Total liabilities” of each of the following ﬁnancial institutions:
U.S. chartered commercial banks (Table L.110, Line 23), savings institutions (Table L.114, Line
23), credit unions (Table L.115, Line 16), issuers of asset-backed securities (Table L.126, Line
11), bank holding companies (Table L.112, Line 11), security brokers and dealers (Table L.129,
Line 13), ﬁnance companies (Table L.127, Line 10), property-casualty insurance companies
(Table L.116, Line 16), life insurance companies (Table L.117, Line 16), funding corporations
(Table L.130, Line 12), and real estate investment trusts (Table L.128, Line 11).
Net Worth is the sum of “Total ﬁnancial assets” minus the sum of “Total liabilities” of each
of the following ﬁnancial institutions: U.S. chartered commercial banks (Table L.110, Line 1
minus Line 23), savings institutions (Table L.114, Line 1 minus Line 23), credit unions (Table
L.115, Line 1 minus Line 16), issuers of asset-backed securities (Table L.126, Line 1 minus
Line 11), bank holding companies (Table L.112, Line 1 minus Line 11), security brokers and
dealers (Table L.129, Line 1 minus Line 13), ﬁnance companies (Table L.127, Line 1 minus Line
10), property-casualty insurance companies (Table L.116, Line 1 minus Line 16), life insurance
companies (Table L.117, Line 1 minus Line 16), funding corporations (Table L.130, Line 1 minus
Line 12), and real estate investment trusts (Table L.128, Line 1 minus Line 11).
Leverage Ratio is is the ratio of Liabilities to Net Worth. Finally, Credit Spread is computed
as the diﬀerence between the quarterly return to capital and the quarterly deposit rate.
Consumption is the sum of “Personal consumption expenditures on nondurables” (PCND)
and “Personal consumption expenditures on services”. Investment is the sum of “Personal con-
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sumption expenditures on durables” (PCDG) and “Gross private domestic investment” (GPDI).
GDP is the sum of Consumption and Investment. Hours is computed as the multiplication of
“average weekly hours in private sector” with “average number of workers in private sector”.
Table 5: Business Cycle Statistics, Quarterly U.S. Data, 1952-2009
GDP C I Leverage R. Liabilities Net Worth Credit Spread
Standard deviation (%) 1.97 0.89 5.56 5.33 2.16 5.76 0.22
Quarterly autocorrelation 0.83 0.86 0.82 0.74 0.92 0.79 0.75
GDP 1 0.54 0.96 -0.08 0.57 0.28 -0.56
C – 1 0.29 0.10 0.07 -0.08 -0.05
Correlation matrix I – – 1 -0.10 0.63 0.33 -0.62
Leverage R. – – – 1 -0.03 -0.92 0.14
Liabilities – – – – 1 0.40 -0.51
Net Worth – – – – – 1 -0.32
Credit Spread – – – – – 1
a Business cycle statistics for GDP, consumption and investment are computed using quarterly data from FRED database.
Consumption is the sum of personal consumption expenditures on nondurables and services (PCND + PCESV). Investment
is the sum of personal consumption expenditures on durable goods and gross private domestic investment (PCDG+ GPDI).
GDP is the sum of consumption and investment.
b Business cycle statistics in the table are based on HP-filtered cyclical components over the period 1952-2009.
c The correlation coefficients greater than 0.13 are statistically significant at 5% significance level.
Table 5 presents business cycle statistics for the aggregate leverage ratio, aggregate liabili-
ties, and aggregate equity of U.S. ﬁnancial sector together with those for the credit spread. The
volatility of the leverage ratio is nearly 3 times larger than that of output and is roughly equal
to that of investment. Table 1 shows that the ﬁnancial leverage ratio is acyclical. The contem-
poraneous correlation between the ﬁnancial leverage ratio and output is -0.08. The volatility of
aggregate equity is 3 times larger than that of output, while the volatility of aggregate debt is
roughly equal to that of output.29 The contemporaneous correlation between aggregate liabili-
ties and output is 0.57 while that between aggregate equity and output is 0.28, indicating that
both series are procyclical.30 Moreover, the contemporaneous correlation with between credit
spread and GDP is -0.56, showing that it is countercyclical.
Table 6 displays the cross-correlations of ﬁnancial variables with diﬀerent lags and leads of
GDP. It shows that aggregate ﬁnancial variables lead business cycles in the U.S. In particular,
the ﬁnancial leverage ratio, equity and credit spread lead output by three, two and one quarters,
respectively. However, liabilities contemporaneously move with output.
The following facts emerge from the empirical analysis above: (1) Financial leverage ratio
and equity are three times more volatile than output, liabilities are a little more volatile than
29Using the Flow of Funds database, Jermann and Quadrini (2009) shows that relative volatilities of non-
financial sector debt and equity to nonfinancial business sector GDP are 1.29 and 1.05, respectively.
30Jermann and Quadrini (2009) find that debt is countercyclical and equity is procyclical for non-financial
firms for the same time period. In addition, using Compustat database, Covas and Den Haan (2006) shows that
debt and equity issuance is procyclical for the majority of publicly listed firms.
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Table 6: Cross Correlations of Financial Variables with Lags and Leads of GDP
Variable Yt−5 Yt−4 Yt−3 Yt−2 Yt−1 Yt Yt+1 Yt+2 Yt+3 Yt+4 Yt+5
Liabilities 0.01 0.13 0.27 0.41 0.52 0.57 0.57 0.50 0.39 0.26 0.12
NetWorth 0.00 0.04 0.09 0.14 0.21 0.28 0.34 0.35 0.31 0.20 0.05
LeverageR. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.03 -0.08 -0.14 -0.18 -0.18 -0.10 0.00
Spread 0.28 0.17 0.03 -0.15 -0.34 -0.56 -0.67 -0.60 -0.46 -0.29 -0.11
a See the footnote (b) in Table 2 for the construction of aggregate financial variables.
b Business cycle statistics in the table are based on HP-filtered cyclical components over the period 1952-
2009.
c The correlation coefficients greater than 0.13 are statistically significant at 5% significance level.
output, (2) liabilities and equity are procyclical, ﬁnancial leverage ratio is acyclical, and credit
spread is countercyclical, and (3) Financial leverage ratio, equity and credit spread lead output
by three, two and one quarters, respectively, while liabilities contemporaneously move with
output.
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Appendix E: Alternative Financial Shocks
This section presents alternative measures of ﬁnancial shocks and the simulation results of the
benchmark models under these alternative measures. I label the benchmark model presented
in the text as Benchmark 1.
The ﬁrst alternative measure for ωt series is constructed using the charge-oﬀ and delinquency
rates of all loans, the level of outstanding loans, and net worth of U.S. commercial banks from
the Federal Reserve Board:
ωt =
(1− Loanlossrates) ∗Outstandingloans
Networth
(81)
Then I construct the log-deviation of ωt series by linearly detrending the log of these series
over the period 1987.Q1-2010.Q4. The ωt series can be interpreted as the level of recovery rates
of loans as a percentage of net worth. These recovery rates determine the level of credit con-
ditions in the economy since banks’ ability to extend loans to non-ﬁnancial businesses depends
on their level of net worth, which can be seen from equation (20). Therefore, the innovations
to ωt are shocks to the recovery rates, hence to the level of ﬁnancial conditions in the economy.
First, I estimate a VAR(1) for both TFP series and this alternative measure of ω. However,
the cross-terms in the VAR coeﬃcient matrix are not statistically signiﬁcant at 5% signiﬁcance
level. Then I estimate two independent AR(1) processes for both series. The resulting persis-
tence of the ω series is ρω = 0.9690 and the standard deviation of the shock is σω = 0.003111.
The levels of zt and ωt series and the innovations to those series are plotted in Figure 11. I label
the model driven by both standard productivity shock and this alternative measure of ﬁnancial
shock as Benchmark 2.
The second alternative measure for ωt series is constructed by calibrating the persistence,
ρω, and the standard deviation of the shock, σω, to match the persistence and the volatility
of net worth in the data. The resulting persistence is ρω = 0.55, and the resulting standard
deviation of the shock is σω = 0.04. I label the model driven by both standard productivity
shock and this alternative measure of ﬁnancial shock as Benchmark 3.
Finally, the third alternative measure for ωt series is constructed as in the main text. How-
ever, this time I estimate a VAR(1) for both TFP and ω series instead of estimating two
independent AR(1) processes as follows:
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
 ẑt+1
ω̂t+1

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ρω,z ρω


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 ẑt
ω̂t

+

 ǫz,t+1
ǫω,t+1


.
The resulting parameters are ρz = 0.9467, ρz,ω = -0.0142, ρω,z = 0.9129, ρω = 0.2824, σz
= 0.006378, and σω = 0.0489. I assume that the shocks are i.i.d. as the correlation coeﬃcient
between the innovations is not statistically signiﬁcant at 5% signiﬁcant level. I label the model
driven by both standard productivity shock and this alternative measure of ﬁnancial shock as
Benchmark 4.
Table 7: Real and Financial Statistics
Statistic Data Benchmark 1 Benchmark 2 Benchmark 3 Benchmark 4
σY 1.80 1.81 1.65 1.83 2.75
σC 0.45 0.75 0.52 0.77 0.57
σI 2.73 4.64 3.77 4.68 5.13
σL 0.91 0.84 0.64 0.88 0.94
ρY,I 0.97 0.87 0.92 0.88 0.97
ρY,C 0.82 -0.03 0.34 -0.09 -0.70
ρY,L 0.83 0.81 0.86 0.81 0.96
σAssets 0.93 0.58 0.53 0.57 0.69
σDeposits 0.69 0.87 0.44 0.74 0.74
σNetWorth 5.17 5.90 2.10 5.17
∗ 4.21
σLeverageR. 5.61 6.40 2.18 5.92 3.68
σSpread 0.08 0.23 0.11 0.22 0.17
ρY,Assets 0.30 0.88 0.91 0.87 0.86
ρY,Deposits -0.39 -0.23 0.48 -0.21 0.19
ρY,NetWorth 0.52 0.68 0.82 0.67 0.70
ρY,LeverageR. -0.49 -0.71 -0.57 -0.66 -0.60
ρY,Spread -0.39 -0.67 -0.78 -0.70 -0.83
a Business cycle statistics in the table are based on HP-filtered cyclical components of quarterly simulated time series
(smoothing parameter:1600).
b The standard deviation of output is expressed in percent; standard deviations of the remaining variables are normalized
by the standard deviation of output (std(x)/std(GDP)).
c ∗ denotes calibration target.
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Table 7 presents the business cycle properties of real and ﬁnancial variables of four diﬀerent
benchmark models under alternative ﬁnancial shock measures. The table suggests that main
results of the paper don’t change across under alternative ﬁnancial shock series: all of the
benchmark models are able to reproduce the key business cycle facts about real variables: con-
sumption and hours are less volatile than output, while investment is more volatile. Investment
and hours are highly procyclical. However, Benchmark 1, 3 and 4 generates a counterfactual
negative or zero correlation between consumption and output. Moreover, Benchmark 4 pre-
dicts higher volatilities in real variables compared to other three models. In terms of ﬁnancial
variables, all of the benchmark models can explain most of the key empirical regularities about
aggregate ﬁnancial variables: bank assets, deposits, and spread are less volatile than output,
while net worth and leverage ratio are more volatile. Assets and net worth are procyclical,
while leverage ratio and spread are countercyclical. Benchmark 1 and 3 predict countercycli-
cal deposits, consistent with the data, while Benchmark 2 and 4 generate procyclical deposits,
contrary to the data. Overall, regardless of which ﬁnancial shock measure is taken, we can
say that ﬁnancial shocks help the theoretical model explain ﬁnancial ﬂuctuations better, while
preserving most of its predictions about real variables.
For interested readers, I also include the ﬁgures (Figure 12 - 19) that display the quarterly
time series of real variables in the data, in the standard RBC model with capital adjustment
costs, and in the benchmark model economies (2 and 4) and that display the quarterly time
series of ﬁnancial variables in the data, in the model driven only by productivity shocks, and in
the benchmark model economies (2 and 4).
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Figure 11: Time Series of Shocks to Productivity and Credit Conditions
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Figure 12: Real Fluctuations: Benchmark 2 vs. RBC model
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Figure 13: Real Fluctuations: Benchmark 2 vs. Only Productivity
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Figure 14: Real Fluctuations: RBC vs. Only Productivity with Benchmark 2 calibration
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Figure 15: Financial Fluctuations: Benchmark 2 vs. Only Productivity
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Figure 16: Real Fluctuations: Benchmark 4 vs. RBC model
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Figure 17: Real Fluctuations: Benchmark 4 vs. Only Productivity
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Figure 18: Real Fluctuations: RBC vs. Only Productivity with Benchmark 4 calibration
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Figure 19: Financial Fluctuations: Benchmark 4 vs. Only Productivity
63
